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THE DEFENSE OF THE MILITARY
ACCUSEDt
WALLACE S. MURPHY*
A. Introduotion
The designation of Fort Jackson as a permanent installation
of the Department of the Army, and the existence of the other
important military installations in the state, insures South Caro-
lina a military population of many thousands. The transient
nature of life in the military service results in a constant turn-
over of this military population, bringing into South Carolina
new people with new legal problems. Many of these legal prob-
lems are directly related to their military service, particularly
those concerned with military criminal law.
In general, a serviceman is subject to two jurisdictions. As a
member of the civilian community he enters into contracts and
leases, buys and sells real estate, executes wills and powers-of-
attorney, files tax returns (state and federal), injures and is
injured, and, on occasion, commits criminal offenses. Except for
the limited protection afforded him by the Soldiers' and Sailors'
Civil Relief Act of 19401 in certain civil matters, the civilian
aspects of the serviceman's life are governed by the law of the
jurisdiction in which he resides. In these matters his legal needs
are ably served by the civilian bar.
In his status as a member of a military service, the serviceman
is subject to a body of law referred to generically as "military
law." The administrative aspects of his military service are
governed by federal statutes and implementing departmental
regulations. For purposes of criminal jurisdiction, he is subject
to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (hereafter referred to
as Code) ,2 and may be tried by courts-martial for offenses
against that Code.
Further, a serviceman who, within the territorial jurisdiction
of a state, commits an offense denounced by state law and by
t The views expressed herein are those of the writer and do not purport to
re lect the policy of the Department of the Army.
*Lieutenant Colonel, Judge Advocate General's Corps, United States Army,
Assistant Staff Judge Advocate, Fort Jackson, South Carolina.
1. 54 Stat. 1178 (1940), 50 U.S.C. §§ 501-48, 560-90 (1958).
2. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1964). (The Uniform Code of Military justice
will be cited hereafter as the UCMJ, and referred to in textual material as
the Code.)
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the Uniform Code of Military Justice, is subject to the concur-
rent jurisdiction of both state and military authorities.3
During fiscal year 1964, there were '76,057 trials by courts-
martial.4 The Army's share of this total was 43,118, or 42.25
trials per thousand strength.5 While statistics in this regard are
not available, a substantial number of the accused in these cases
retained civilian counsel. The existence of this potential criminal
practice in South Carolina would seem to justify an examination
of the court-martial system.
Although military criminal law contains much that is familiar
to the civilian practitioner, sufficient differences exist that one's
lack of expertise in the field is readily apparent, and, in the cold
unsympathetic eye of the court, he is made to look the fool, there-
by doing himself and his client no service.
It is the purpose of this article to acquaint the civilian prac-
titioner with the types of military courts, their jurisdictional
limitations, and some of the more important procedural and sub-
stantive rules of military criminal law. Although all the serv-
ices are governed by the Uniform Code of Military Justice, dif-
ferences in matters of procedure exist. Throughout this article,
Army procedure will be used as the basis for discussion and
minor differences among the services will be ignored.
B. The Present System of Courts-Martial
The Uniform Code of Military Justice has been the basic law
governing the administration of military justice in the Armed
Forces since 31 May 1951. The Code provides, in article 16,6 for
three kinds of courts-martial, namely:
1. General courts-martial, consisting of a law officer and
not less than five members;
2. Special courts-martial, consisting of not less than three
members; and
3. Summary courts-martial, consisting of one officer.
3. A trial in a state court does not bar a subsequent trial by court-martal.
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1951, para. 68d (hereafter
cited as MCM, 1951). As a practical matter, however, military authorities exer-
cise jurisdiction in such cases only under the most compelling circumstances.
See Army Reg. 22-12, 24 April 1958.
4. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS
AND THE JUDGE ADVOCATES GENERAL OF THE ARM ED FORCES AND THE GENERAL
COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY FOR THE PERIOD JANUARY 1,
1964 TO DECEMBER 31, 1964, United States Government Printing Office, p. 43.
5. Id. at 57.
19651
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For each general court-martial, the commander convening the
court must appoint as trial and defense counsel qualified lawyers
who have been certified by the appropriate Judge Advocate
General as competent to perform such duties.7 General courts-
martial may adjudge any penalty (including the death sentence)
not forbidden by the Code.8
For each special court-martial, the convening authority must
appoint a trial and defense counsel. Persons appointed as trial
and defense counsel of special courts-martial need not be lawyers.
However, if the trial counsel of a special court-martial is a law-
yer, the appointed defense counsel must be similarly qualified.,
Special courts-martial may adjudge any punishment not for-
bidden by the Code except death, dishonorable discharge, dis-
missal, confinement in excess of six months, hard labor without
confinement in excess of three months, forfeiture of pay exceed-
ing two-thirds pay per month, or forfeiture of pay for a period
exceeding six months.10 A further limitation on the powers of
a special court-martial is that it may not adjudge a bad conduct
discharge "unless a complete record of the proceedings and testi-
mony before the court has been made."'1
The Code does not provide for the appointment of counsel for
summary courts-martial. Summary courts-martial may adjudge
any punishment not forbidden by the Code except death, dismis-
sal, dishonorable or bad conduct discharge, confinement in excess
of one month, hard labor without confinement in excess of forty-
five days, or forfeiture of pay in excess of two-thirds of one
month's pay.
12
C. PretriaZ Procedure
A complaint of wrongdoing on the part of a serviceman us-
ually is referred to the individual's immediate commanding offi-
cer for action. If, after investigation, that officer determines that
an offense has been committed and that trial by court-martial is
6. 10 U.S.C. § 816 (1964).
7. UCMJ, art. 27(b), 10 U.S.C. §827(b) (1964).
8. UCMJ, art. 18, 10 U.S.C. § 818 (1964).
9. UCMJ, art. 27(c), 10 U.S.C. §827(c) (1964).
10. UCMJ, art. 19, 10 U.S.C. § 819 (1964).
11. Ibid. Reporters may not be appointed for Army special courts-martial
without special authorization in each instance by The Judge Advocate General
acting on behalf of the Secretary of the Army. Army Reg. 22-145, para. 1,
17 August 1964.
12. UCMJ, art. 20, 10 U.S.C. § 820 (1964).
[Vol. 1,7
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warranted, he will prefer charges."' The charges are then for-
warded, with recommendation as to their disposition, to the
commander who is authorized to convene summary courts-mar-
tial for the trial of cases in the command.
14
The summary court-martial convening authority is empow-
ered to dismiss charges, refer them to a summary court-martial,
or forward them with his recommendation for trial by a special
or general court-martial. Should trial by a general court-martial
appear appropriate, the officer exercising summary court-mar-
tial jurisdiction must refer the charges to a disinterested officer
for a thorough and impartial investigation and recommendation
as to disposition. The report of this "article 32" investigation
must accompany all charges that are forwarded with a recom-
mendation for trial by a general court-martial.1 5
Charges received by the general court-martial convening au-
thority are referred routinely to the staff judge advocate for
consideration and advice. The general court-martial convening
authority is empowered to dismiss the charges, return them to
the subordinate commander for disposition, refer them to a
summary or special court-martial for trial, or refer them to a
general court-martial for trial.' 6 The advice of the staff judge
advocate is a prerequisite to reference for trial by a general
court-martial.17
A military accused has a right to be represented by military
counsel when charges against him are referred for a formal pre-
trial investigation pursuant to Article 32, Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice, and when his case is referred for trial by a special
or general court-martial. Neither the Uniform Code of Military
13. Charges are preferred when the accuser signs a charge sheet containing
the allegation of an offense. The "Charge" is the article of the UCMJ that is
alleged to have been violated. The "Specification of the Charge" contains the
specific allegations that constitute the offense.
14. Summary courts-martial may be convened by the commanding officer of
a detached company or other detachment of the Army, and by any person who
may convene a special or general court-martial. UCMJ, art. 24, 10 U.S.C. § 824
(1964).
15. UCMJ, art 32, 10 U.S.C. § 832 (1964). If the summary court-martial
convening authority also has special court-martial jurisdiction, he may refer
the charges to a special court-martial for trial. Army commanding officers who
have summary court-martial jurisdiction almost invariably have special court-
martial jurisdiction.
16. MCM, 1951, para. 35. The general court-martial convening authority
rarely refers cases to summary or special courts-martial. If trial by a general
court-martial is not deemed warranted, the charges normally are dismissed or
returned to the subordinate commander "for such other action az may be deemed
appropriate."
17. UCMJ, art 34, 10 U.S.C. § 834 (1964).
1965]
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Justice nor the Manual for Courts-Martial makes any reference
to defense counsel in connection with summary courts-martial.
However, the Judge Advocate General of the Army has ex-
pressed the opinion that an accused should be permitted to be
represented by counsel at a trial by summary court-martial when
he has obtained one for that purpose.' 8 Further, an accused or
suspect may, at any stage of an investigation, request that he be
permitted to consult with counsel of his own selection or with a
judge advocate. If his request is denied, any statement subse-
quently made by him during the investigation will be excluded
as evidence at his trial by court-martial. 9 There is, however, no
requirement that the accused or suspect be advised of his right
to consult with counsel.
20
The civilian attorney who is retained at an early stage in the
pretrial process may be assisted by certain predispositions on the
part of military commanders which are the inherent result of the
court-martial system. The military commander is responsible for
the efficiency, discipline, morale, and welfare of his unit. In
short, he is responsible for everything that takes place, and for
everything that fails to take place, in his command. It follows
that the administration of military justice at the unit or trial
level is a function of command. Although the staff judge advo-
cate of a command supervises the administration of military
justice in that command, he functions in an advisory capacity.
In the final analysis the decision of the commander determines
whether an accused is to be tried by a court-martial, and, if so,
by what type of court.
Foremost in the mind of every military commander is the
accomplishment of the mission assigned his command. Anything
that tends to hinder the accomplishment of that mission is viewed
with varying degrees of disfavor.
There are few occurrences which can disrupt the normal trans-
action of military business to the same extent as does a trial by
court-martial. The members of general courts-martial, and all
personnel of inferior courts-martial, perform their court duties
18. Letter From Headquarters, Department of the Army, Office of The Judge
Advocate General, subject: "Problem Areas in the Administration of Military
Justice," 14 February 1964.
19. United States v. Gunnels, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 130, 23 C.M.R. 354 (1957). If
the accused or suspect requests consultation with a judge advocate, the require-
ments of due process will be met if the judge advocate advises the suspect of
his right to retain civilian counsel. United States v. Gunnels, supra.
20. CM 404320, Watkins, 30 C.M.R. 513 (1960), petition denied, 30 C.M.R.,
417 (1961).
[Vol. 17
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in addition to their regular duties. Further, the administrative
burden created by a high court-martial rate may become almost
intolerable. Witnesses must be interviewed and frequently de-
tained beyond scheduled departure dates; charge sheets and
statements of expected testimony prepared; psychiatric examina-
tions accomplished; records of trial prepared and reviewed; and
court-martial orders published.
By no means the least of the basic concepts which commanders
must consider when an offense has been committed is the em-
phasis placed on the conservation of manpower.
Conservation of manpower is of vital concern to our nation
and the Army. Unnecessary resort to courts-martial and the
indiscriminate discharge and confinement of offenders re-
sult not only in decreased efficiency and lowered discipline,
but in an unjustified loss of manpower as well. A command-
er should not decide upon trial by court-martial until he has
determined that other means of disposing of the offense, in-
cluding administrative action and the imposition of punish-
ment under Article 15, UCMJ, will not meet the ends of
justice and discipline.2 1
Reams of paper have been printed on the subject of "leader-
ship." There are "leadership courses" and "leadership schools."
The Army's Command and General Staff College teaches a sub-
ject which is a leadership course called by another name. Famous
military commanders are called "great leaders of men." Although
this important quality may be defined satisfactorily, its presence
or absence in an individual can be detected only by the observa-
tion of performance and the measurement of results. Accord-
ingly, military commanders are judged largely by the results
they attain. Of some importance in this regard is the state of
discipline in a command as reflected in the court-martial rate,
article 15 rate, absence without leave rate, and other indicia.
To accomplish its mission this command must be well-
disciplined. Its members must work as a team, with each
member performing his or her duties willingly. Good discip-
line is best obtained by good leadership. Exemplary leader-
ship, proper training, efficient use of personnel, and appro-
21. Fort Jackson Reg. 22-1, 22 July 1964, para. 4a. Administrative action may
include admonition, reprimand, criticism, etc., written or oral. Punishment im-
posed pursuant to art. 15, UCMJ, is nonjudicial in nature and is imposed by
commanders with the consent of the individual punished. See MCM, 1951,
ch. XXVL
1965]
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priate recreational programs tend to reduce breaches of
discipline. The excessive use of courts-martial, generally, is
a reflection on the quality of leadership of the commander
concerned.
22
In summary, commanders resort to trial by court-martial only
where the nature of the offense or the past record of the offender
demands such action. Where trial by court-martial is deemed
necessary, the charges are referred to the lowest court which, in
the opinion of the convening authority, can impose an adequate
sentence. Frequently, mitigating and extenuating circumstances
exist which, if brought to the attention of the commander con-
cerned, can assist him in reaching his decision. The attorney can
render a valuable service to his client, and to the military, by
insuring that all information favorable to his client is brought
to the attention of the convening authority prior to his action
on the charges.
The attorney who is retained at the outset of an Article 32
investigation has a unique opportunity to ascertain the nature
and extent of all evidence against his client without disclosing
his theory of defense.
At the outset of the investigation the accused will be in-
formed of the following; the offense charged against him;
the name of the accuser and of the witnesses against him as
far as then known by the investigating officer; the fact that
charges are about to be investigated; his right to have coun-
sel represent him at the investigation if he so desires, as
provided in Article 32 [of the UCMJ]; his right to cross-
examine witnesses against him if they are available and to
present anything he may desire in his own behalf, either in
defense, extenuation, or mitigation; his right to have the
investigating officer examine available witnesses requested
by him; his right to make a statement in any form, but that
he is not required to make any statement regarding the of-
fense of which he is accused or being investigated, and that
any statement he may make may be used as evidence against
him in a trial by courtmartial.
23
22. Id. para. 4b. (Emphasis added.)
23. MCM, 1951, para. 34b. The article 32 investigation is treated in depth
by Lieutenant Colonel William A. Murphy, USMC, in his excellent article
The Formal Pretrial Investigation, Mih- L. REv., April 1961 (DA PAm 27-100-
12, 1 April 1961), P. 1.
[Vol. 17
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The rights of the accused to be represented by counsel at the
article 32 investigation are extensive. He may; (1) request mili-
tary counsel by name; (2) request that counsel be appointed by
the officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction; or (3)
be represented by civilian counsel provided by him.24 Counsel
provided by the general court-martial convening authority must
be a qualified lawyer.25 If the counsel requested by name is not a
lawyer, the accused must execute a waiver of his right to be
represented by a lawyer.2 6 Civilian counsel retained by an ac-
cused usually is in addition to military counsel, and is in com-
plete charge of his client's case. It is not unusual in serious cases
for an accused to be represented by counsel requested by name,
counsel provided by the general court-martial convening author-
ity, and civilian counsel retained by the accused.
Despite the extensive rights granted an accused at the pretrial
investigation, neither the Code nor the Manual for Courts-Mar-
tial contain any provisions concerning the Government's right to
be represented at the investigation. It seems clear however, that
the Government as well as the accused has the right to be repre-
sented by counsel at the article 32 investigation.
The Article 32 investigation is an important part of court-
martial procedure. Mainifestly, the Government as well as
the accused has an immediate and material interest in the
proceedings. Although no provision of the Uniform Code
of Military Justice or the Manual requires the Government
to be present, its appearance may be desirable and helpful.
* * * Suffice it for our purposes to say, as did the board
of review, below, that 'we can find no fault' with the prac-
tice, which has the legitimate effect of making the investi-
gation 'an adversary proceeding, presided over by the inves-
tigating officer.
2 7
Civilian attorneys may find it strange indeed that although
the importance of the pretrial investigation is emphasized by
statute and court decision, Congress has not seen fit to grant the
investigating officer the power of subpoena. However, the ab-
sence of the subpoena power rarely becomes a matter of concern
24. UCMJ, art. 34(b), 10 U.S.C. §834 (b) (1964).
25. United States v. Tomaszewski, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 266, 24 C.M.R. 76 (1957).
26. Ibid. The certificate of waiver is included on the printed form for the
investigating officer's report. DD Form 457, 1 June 1959.
27. United States v. Weaver, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 147, 32 C.M.R 147 (1962).
Cases cited by the court are omitted.
19651
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to the defense. Military witnesses are compelled to attend by
official orders, and depositions of civilian witnesses may be
obtained if they refuse to appear at the investigation.28
When a case is referred to a general or special court-martial
for trial the charges are served on the accused and the appointed
defense counsel is furnishd a file containing, as a minimum, a
copy of the charge sheet on which the offense is alleged, and
copies of all statements of expected testimony. Thus the defense
is completely apprised of the nature and extent of the Govern-
ment's case.
An accused may not be brought to trial, over his objection, by
special court-martial within three days from the service of the
charges, 29 or by general court-martial within five days from the
service of the charges.80 Requests for continuances, if made be-
fore the court convenes, should be directed to the convening
authority. After the court has convened, requests for continu-
ances are made to the law officer of a general court-martial or
to the president of a special court-martial as may be appropriate.
Although the granting of a continuance is a discretionary mat-
ter, the denial of such a request based upon good cause may be an
abuse of discretion and require reversal in case of conviction."'
Accordingly, counsel for the defense have ample opportunity to
interview witnesses and prepare the defense of the case. Further
in this regard, military authorities cooperate fully in making
military personnel and civilian employees available for inter-
view.
Defense counsel should, in an appropriate case, give careful
consideration to the advisability of entering into a guilty plea
agreement with the convening authority. These pretrial agree-
ments are usually of three types or combinations thereof, as
follows:
1. The accused agrees to plead guilty and the convening au-
thority agrees not to approve a sentence greater than that set
forth in the agreement;
2. The accused agrees to plead guilty to a lesser offense and
the convening authority agrees to withdraw and dismiss the
greater offense; and
28. Murphy, .rpra note 23, at 26-28.
29. UCMJ, art. 35, 10 U.S.C. § 835 (1964).
30. Ibid.
31. United States v. Daniels, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 52, 28 C.M.R. 276 (1959).
[Vol. 17
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8. The accused agrees to plead guilty to one or more offenses
and the convening authority agrees to withdraw and dismiss
the remaining offenses.
The policies of the Judge Advocate General of the Army
concerning pretrial agreements are summarized as follows:82
1. The offer to plead guilty must originate with the accused
and the sentence agreed upon must be appropriate for the of-
fense;
2. The offer to plead guilty may be accepted only if the avail-
able evidence of guilt is convincing;
3. Unreasonable multiplication of charges which might tend
to induce an offer to plead guilty will be avoided;
4. The agreement must be in writing, unambiguous, and con-
tain no provision circumscribing the rights of the accused;
5. The agreement must be scrupulously carried out by the
Government;
6. The court-martial must be made sufficiently aware of the
circumstances of the offense and the accused must be allowed
to present matters in mitigation and extenuation so that the
court-martial may determine an appropriate sentence;
7. The law officer should determine, at an out-of-court hear-
ing, that the accused is fully aware of his rights and understands
the meaning and effect of his plea of guilty. The law officer
should further ascertain whether the accused is satisfied with
appointed counsel, and determine from the accused personally
whether he is pleading guilty because he is guilty;
8. The pretrial agreement is made an appellate exhibit to the
record of trial, and the out-of-court hearing is recorded and
transcribed verbatim.
9. The court-martial should not be made aware of the existence
of a prertial agreement.
In order that the court may be made aware of the circum-
stances of the case, the pretrial agreement normally is condi-
tioned upon the prosecution and defense being able to agree to
a written stipulation of fact to be presented to the court. Failure
to agree to the content of the stipulation will vitiate the agree-
32. MCM, 1951, United States Army 1959 Cumulative Pocket Part, p. 39.
1965]
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ment. The civilian attorney is well-advised to utilize the experi-
ence of the appointed defense counsel in determining the terms
of an offer to plead guilty and the content of the stipulation of
fact.
D. Trial Procedure
The power "to make Rules for the Government and Regula-
tion of the land and naval Forces" is vested in the Congress by
the United States Constitution. 3 In the exercise of this consti-
tutional authority, Congress has delegated the power to make
rules of procedure for trials by courts-martial to the President.
(a) The procedure, including modes of proof, in cases
before courts-martial, courts of inquiry, military commis-
sions, and other military tribunals may be prescribed by the
President by regulations which shall, so far, as he deems
practicable, apply the principles of law and the rules of evi-
dence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in
the United States district courts, but which shall not be con-
trary to or inconsistent with this code.
(b) All rules and regulations made in pursuance of this
article shall be uniform insofar as practicable and shall be
reported to the Congress.3"
Pursuant to this delegated authority, the President has pro-
mulgated the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1951. 35
A trial by court-martial is a criminal trial wherein the United
States is the sovereign party. Although military trials are open
to the public and to press coverage,3 6 spectators are rarely very
numerous. Witnesses are excluded from the courtroom except
when they are testifying.
3 7
The civilian attorney who is accustomed to the normal day
in a term of criminal court of general jurisdiction will find it
difficult to imagine the degree of formality with which military
trials are usually conducted. The formality of a trial by court-
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
34. UCMJ, art. 36, 10 U.S.C. § 836 (1964).
35. Exec. Order No. 10214, 15 Fed. Reg. 1303 (1951). Numerous amend-
ments to the manual have been made by subsequent Executive Orders. These
amendments were published, in January 1963, as an addendum to the manual.
36, For special circumstances under which spectators may be limited see
United States v. Brown, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 251, 22 C.M.R. 41 (1956).
37. MCM, 1951, para. 53f.
[Vol. 17
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martial is the direct result of military custom and the rules of
military trial procedure.
From the time a court-martial is called to order by the presi-
dent of the court until court is adjourned, the sole business before
that court is the trial of one or more accused at a single trial.
The few spectators who may be present from time to time enter
and leave almost noiselessly; there are no bailiffs or other offi-
cials entering and leaving with defendants who have been tried
or who are awaiting trial; there are no decrees, orders, or war-
rants being presented to the presiding judge for signature.
Should some matter of importance require the immediate atten-
tion of a party to a military trial the court is recessed until the
matter is concluded. While superiority in military rank has no
place in, a military trial,3 8 the normal dictates of military cour-
tesy contribute substantially to the formality of military trials.
Finally, as all parties to the trial are keenly aware that each
record of trial is reviewed for legal sufficiency by the convening
authority and by higher reviewing authorities, they tend to exer-
cise extreme care in their choice of words and actions.
Detailed procedural guides for trials by general and special
courts-martial are set forth in the Manual for Courts-Martial.
89
These guides are actually scripts that the parties to the trial
recite almost verbatim. The use of the procedural guides is inval-
uable in establishing affirmatively that the court has jurisdiction
over the accused and the offense charged and that all procedural
prerequisites to a trial on the merits of the case have been met.
Preliminarily, the following matters are recited into the
record:
1. The order appointing the court and all amendments thereto;
2. The names of all persons named in the appointing orders-
each such person being accounted for as present or absent;
3. The name, rank, and organization of the accused and the
fact that he is present in court;
4. The name of the appointed reporter and the oath adminis-
tered to the reporter by the trial counsel;
38. MCM, 1951, para. 41b. The senior member of the court is the president
MCM, 1951, para. 40a. The junior member collects and counts the votes. MCM,
1951, paras. 74d (2), 76b (2).
39. MCM, 1951, app. 8.
19651
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5. The qualifications and lack of disqualifications of counsel
for both sides;40
6. That the accused, if an enlisted member, has or has not
requested that the membership of the court include enlisted
personnel.41
After these preliminary matters have been covered to the
satisfaction of all concerned, the parties to the trial are sworn-
the court members and the law officer by the trial counsel, and
the trial and defense counsel (including individual counsel) by
the president of the court. This completes the convening of the
court.
Challenges at military trials may be peremptory or for cause.
The prosecution has a right to one peremptory challenge against
any member of the court and each accused has a right to one such
peremptory challenge.
42
The law officer of a general court-martial may only be chal-
lenged for cause.43
The law officer, court members, and the trial counsel have an
affirmative duty to disclose any facts known to them that may
be grounds for challenge for cause. 44 If the undisputed facts
40. No person who has acted as investigating officer, law officer, or court
member in any case shall subsequently act as trial counsel, assistant trial
counsel, or, unless expressly requested by the accused, as defense counsel
or assistant defense counsel in the same case. No person who has acted for
the prosecution shall act subsequently in the same case for the defense,
nor shall any person who has acted for the defense act subsequently in the
same case for the prosecution.
UCMJ, art. 27 (a), 10 U.S.C. § 827 (a) (1964).
41. If, prior to the convening of a court-martial, an enlisted accused requests
in writing that the membership of the court include enlisted personnel, at least
one-third of the court members must be enlisted personnel. UCMJ, art. 25(c),
10 U.S.C. §825 (c) (1964).
42. UCMJ, art. 41(b), 10 U.S.C. §841 (b) (1964).
43. Ibid.
44. MCM, 1951, para. 62b. Among the grounds for challenge are:
(1) That the challenged law officer or member is not eligible to serve
as law officer or member, respectively, on courts-martial.
(2) That he is not a member or law officer of the court.
(3) That he is the accuser as to any offense charged. See [UCMJ]
Article 1 (11) for definition of accuser.
(4) That he will be a witness for the prosecution. See [MCM, 1951,
para.] 63 for definition of witness for the prosecution.
(5) That he was the investigating officer as to any offense charged. See
[MCM, 1951, para.] 64 for definition of investigating officer.
(6) That he has acted as counsel for the prosecution or the accused as
to any offense charged.
(7) That (upon a rehearing or a new trial) he was a member of the
court which first heard the case.
[Vol. r,
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show the existence of any of the first eight grounds for challenge
listed in the manual,45 the member or law officer is absolutely
disqualified and must be excused forthwith.
48
Voir dire examination of the court members or the law officer
is conducted by counsel, who may, at his option, require the indi-
vidual being questioned to answer under oath.
47
The Code provides that the law officer of a general court-
martial may not rule upon a challenge for cause. 48 Challenges for
cause are determined singly49 by a majority vote of the court
members, with a tie vote operating to disqualify the challenged
meinber.5O "Deliberation and voting upon a challenge will be in
closed session, and the law officer and the challenged member,
(8) That he is an enlisted member who is assigned to the same unit as
the accused. See [MCM, 1951, para.] 4a and [UCMJ] Article 25(c) (2)
for definitions of the word "unit".
(9) That he has forwarded the charges in the case with his personal
recommendation concerning trial by court-martial.
(10) That he has formed or expressed a positive and definite opinion
as to the guilt or innocence of the accused as to any offense charged.
(11) That he has acted in the same case as the convening authority or
as the legal officer or staff judge advocate to the convening authority.
(12) That he will act in the same case as the reviewing authority
[MCM, 1951, para.] (84) or staff judge advocate to the reviewing au-
thority [MCM, 1951, para.] (85a).
(13) Any other facts indicating that he should not sit as a member or
law officer in the interest of having the trial and subsequent proceedings
free from substantial doubt as to legality, fairness, and impartiality. Ex-
amples of other facts constituting grounds for challenge are: That (upon
a rehearing or new trial) he was the law officer of the court which first
heard the case; that he will be a witness for the defense; that he testified
or submitted a written statement in connection with the investigation of
the charges (unless at the request of the accused) ; that he has officially
expressed an opinion as to the mental condition of the accused; that, when
it can be avoided, a member is junior in rank or grade to the accused; that
he has a direct personal interest in the result of the trial; that he is in any
way closely related to the accused; that he participated in the trial of a
closely related case; that he is decidedly hostile or friendly to the accused;
that (in a case involving an offense punishable by death) a member of
the court has conscientious scruples against imposing the death penalty;
that, not having been present as a member when testimony on the merits
was heard, or other important proceedings were had in the case, his sitting
as a member will involve an appreciable risk of injury to the substantial
rights of an accused, which risk will not be avoided by a reading of the
record. In connection with this last example, see [MCM, 1951, paras.] 41e
and f, and 62h (1).
MCM, 1951, para. 62f.
45. See ibid.
46. MCM, 1951, para. 62h (2).
47. Ibid.
48. UCMJ, art. 41(a), 10 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1964); UCMJ, art. 51(b), 10
U.S.C. § 851(b) (1964).
49. UCMJ, art. 41(a), 10 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1964).
50. UCMJ, art. 52(c), 10 U.S.C. § 852(c) (1964).
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if any, will be excluded. '51 As a matter of practice, however,
when it is disclosed, in general terms, that a ground for chal-
lenge may exist, the particulars of the challenge may be heard
at an out-of-court hearing. If the evidence received at the out-
of-court hearing convinces the law officer that denial of the
challenge would be error, he will excuse the challenged member
without submitting the matter to the court. This practice, though
erroneous, does not violate any substantial rights of the ac-
cused,5 2 and has the salutory effect of avoiding the possibility
of prejudicial error resulting from the erroneous denial of the
challenge by the court. Further, in this regard, receiving the
particulars of the challenge at an out-of-court hearing avoids
contaminating the other court members with information that
would subject them to challenge on the same grounds asserted
against the challenged member.
The arraignment proceeding at a trial by court-martial con-
sists of the reading of the charges and specifications and calling
upon the accused to plead thereto.58 The pleas of the accused are
not a part of the arraignment."4 After an accused has been ar-
raigned, his subsequent voluntary and unauthorized absence will
not terminate the jurisdiction of the court and the trial may
continue to findings and sentence. 55
With the single exception of challenges, as discussed above, all
rulings upon interlocutory questions arising during court-martial
proceedings are ruled upon by the law officer of a general court-
martial and by the president of a special court-martial. 5
Any such ruling made by the law officer of a general
court-martial upon any interlocutory question other than a
motion for a finding of not guilty or the question of the
accused's sanity shall be final and constitute the ruling of
the court. . . . The president of a special court-martial will
rule in open court upon all interlocutory questions other
51. MCM, 1951, para. 62h (3). As a result of the application of the rules for
deciding challenges, court members may be called upon to decide challenges
nade on grounds on which they themselves may be subject to challenge.
52. United States v. Jones, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 283, 22 C.M.P. 73 (1956).
53. MCM, 1951, para. 65a.
54. Ibid. CM 347614, Houghtaling, 2 C.M.R. 229 (1951); ACM 4742, Wahl,
4 C.M.R. 767 (1952).
55. MCM, 1951, para. l1c. A similar provision of the Manual for Courts-
Martial, U. S. Army, 1949, was upheld by the Court of Military Appeals in
United States v. Houghtaling, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 230, 8 C.M.R. 30 (1953), a capital
case in which the death sentence was not adjudged.
56. UCMJ, art. 51(b), 10 U.S.C. § 851(b) (1964); MCM, 1951, para. 57a.
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than challenges arising during the trial .... If a member
objects to a ruling of the president upon a question, the
court shall be closed and the question voted on as stated in
[M M, 1951, Para.] 57f. . . .Rulings by the law officer
on a motion for a finding of not guilty ([MCM, 1951, Para.]
71a) and on the question of the sanity of an accused ([MCM,
1951, para.] 122b) are final unless objected to by a member
of the court. When proper objection is made to a ruling of
the law officer on these two matters, he may give the court
such instructions as will better enable the members to under-
stand the question they are to determine and the manner in
which it is to be determined. Thereafter the court will be
closed and the question decided by a vote of the members
of the courtS
7
At a trial by special court-martial the presentation of evidence
and argument on interlocutory questions must, of course, be had
in open court. Law officers of general courts-martial, however,
make full use of the out-of-court hearing.
When the law officer hears evidence or extensive argu-
ment on a matter subject to his exclusive determination, the
"preferred practice is for the argument to be held out of the
presence of the court-martial members." United States v.
Bouie, 9 USCMA 228, 233, 26 CMR 8. The practice is par-
ticularly important in proceeding on a defense objection to
the admissibility of a pretrial statement by the accused be-
cause substantial evidence bearing on the admissibility
question, but immaterial to the merits, is frequently intro-
duced. See United States v. Dicario, 8 USCMA 353, 24
CMR 163. Generally, therefore, on reguest, an accused is
entitled to an out-of-court hearing on an objection to the
admissibility of a pretrial statement made by him. 58
The trial of a court-martial case on its merits-the presenta-
tion of evidence, instructions by the law officer (or president
of a special court-martial), and arguments of counsel-follows
57. MCM, 1951, para. 57. When, upon proper objection, an interlocutory
question is to be decided by the court, it shall be determined by majority vote.
A tie vote on a motion for a finding of not guilty or on a motion relating to
the question of the sanity of an accused is a determination against the accused.
A tie vote on any other interlocutory question is a determination in favor of
the accused. UCMJ, art. 52(c), 10 U.S.C. §852(c) (1964).
58. United States v. Lock, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 611, 33 C.M.R. 143 (1963). (Em-
phasis supplied.) The denial of a defense request for an out-of-court hearing is
grounds for reversal if the accused is prejudiced thereby. United States v. Lock,
supra.
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generally accepted rules of criminal procedure, and should pre-
sent no problems not encountered in civilian criminal courts of
record. However, as the findings (verdict of guilt or innocence)
and the sentence are both determined by the court, but separately,
certain rules that apply prior to findings are relaxed during the
post-findings proceedings.
As a result of the military rule that all known offenses should
be disposed of at a single trial,59 totally unrelated offenses are
frequently disposed of at one trial. An accused at such a trial
has the right, before findings, not only to testify or to remain
silent, but to limit his testimony to less than all of the offenses
charged.10 If an accused does so limit his testimony he cannot
be cross-examined about these offenses concerning which he does
not testify.0 '
If findings of guilty as to any offense charged are announced
by the court, the trial then enters into presentencing proceedings.
During these proceedings the prosecution presents to the court
the personal data concerning the accused as shown on the charge
sheet,(2 and admissible evidence of previous convictions.63
With respect to matters in mitigation and extenuation, the
rules of evidence may be relaxed in favor of the accused to the
extent that certificates, affidavits, letters and other writings
may be received in evidence.0 4 Further, the testimonial rights of
the accused at the presentencing proceedings are somewhat
broader than those he enjoys prior to findings. In addition to
the right to testify or remain silent, the accused may make an
unsworn statement orally or in writing, either personally,
through counsel or both. 5 This unsworn statement is not evi-
dence, and the accused cannot be cross-examined upon it"B or
interrogated by court members on the substance of it. 67
59. MCM, 1951, para. 30f.
60. MCM, 1951, para. 149b(1).
61. Ibid.
62. MCM, 1951, para. 75b(1). These data are the age, pay and service of the
accused, and the nature and duration of any pretrial restraint.
63. MCM, 1951, para. 75b(2). Such evidence must relate to offenses com-
mitted during the accused's current enlistment, or other service obligation, and
during the three years prior to the commission of any offense charged.
64. MCM, 1951, para. 75c(1).
65. MCM, 1951, para. 75c(2).
66. Ibid.
67. United States v. King, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 71, 30 C.M.R. 71 (1961). The un-
sworn statement is, therefore, offered for such weight as the court may care to
give it. The fact that the accused may not be cross-examined on the statement
does not prevent the prosecution from rebutting anything contained therein.
MCM, 1951, para. 75c(2).
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A unanimous verdict is not required at a military trial unless
the death sentence is mandatory.0 8 In all other cases, two-thirds
of the members present must concur in a finding of guilty. 9
If, in computing the number of votes required, a fraction
results, such fraction shall be counted as one; thus, if five
members are to vote, a requirement that two-thirds concur
is not met unless four concur. A finding of not guilty results
as to any specification or charge if no other valid finding
is reached thereon; however, a court may reconsider any
finding before the same is formally announced in open court.
The court may reconsider any finding of guilty on its own
motion at any time before it has first announced the sen-
tence in the case.7
0
A sentence of death requires the concurrence of all the mem-
bers present,71 and a sentence to imprisonment in excess of ten
years requires the concurrence of three-fourths of the members
present.72 All other sentences require the concurrence of two-
thirds of the members present.78 Although the court may recon-
sider its sentence at any time before the record of trial has been
authenticated and transmitted to the convening authority, it may
not increase the severity of the sentence adjudged unless the
sentence prescribed for the offense of which the accused has been
convicted is mandatory.
7 4
E. Post-Trial Proeedure
The duties of the trial defense counsel are not concluded with
the announcement of the sentence by the president of the court-
martial.7 5 It is considered part of the defense counsel's duties
to represent the accused in all matters directly related to the trial
which arise prior to the time the record of trial is forwarded for
68. UCMJ, art. 52(a)(1), 10 U.S.C. §852(a)(1) (1964).
69. UCMJ, art. 52(a) (2), 10 U.S.C. § 852(a) (2) (1964).
70. MCM, 1951, para. 74d(3).
71. UCMJ, art. 52(b)(1), 10 U.S.C. § 852(b) (1) (1964).
72. UCMJ, art. 52(b) (2), 10 U.S.C. § 852(b) (2) (1964).
73. UCMJ, art 52(b) (3), 10 U.S.C. § 852(b) (3) (1964). As in the case
of voting on the findings (see text above note 70), if in computing the number
of votes required a fraction results, such fraction is counted as one. MCM,
1951, para. 76b(3).
74. UCMJ, art 62(b), 10 U.S.C. §862(b) (1964); MCM, 1951, para. 76c.
75. United States v. Darring, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 651, 26 C.M.R. 431 (1958).
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appellate review,76 and to cooperate with appellate counsel until
the appellate process is completed.
After the sentence has been announced, the defense counsel
may contact the members of the court and ascertain their views
concerning the submission of a clemency petition to the conven-
ing authority.
Mitigating circumstances which could not be taken into
consideration in determining the sentence may be the basis
of a recommendation for clemency by individual members
of the court. The recommendation should represent the free
and voluntary expression of the individuals who join there-
in. It should be specific as to the amount and character of
the clemency recommended and as to the reasons for the
recommendation.
77
The type of clemency most often recommended by the mem-
bers of a court-martial is the suspension of all or part of the
76. The term "appellate review" does not include the initial review and action
by the convening authority as discussed in this section, but refers to the subse-
quent review as provided by the UCMJ. The Code provides, in substance, that
after action on the findings and sentence is taken by the convening authority,
records of trial are further reviewed as follows:
a. Summary courts-martial, and special courts-martial not involving an
approved sentence of bad conduct discharge (see note 11) are finally reviewed
by a judge advocate on the staff of the officer exercising general court-martial
jurisdiction (UCMJ, art. 65(c), 10 U.S.C. §865(c) (1964); MCM, 1951,
para. 94a) ;
b. Special courts-martial involving approved sentences of bad conduct dis-
charge are forwarded to the officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction
and thereafter reviewed in the same manner as general courts-martial [UCMJ,
art. 65(b), 10 U.S.C. §865(b) (1964); MCM, 1951, para. 94a(3)];
c. General courts-martial involving approved sentences affecting general or
flag officers or extending to death, dismissal, dishonorable or bad conduct dis-
charges, or confinement for one year or more, are reviewed by a board of re-
view in the Office of The Judge Advocate General (UCMJ, art. 66(a), 10
U.S.C. §866(a) (1964); MCM, 1951, para. 100);
d. Other general courts-martial are examined in the Office of The Judge
Advocate General. If error is found to be present, or if The Judge Advocate
General so directs, the case is referred to a board of review (UCMJ, art. 69,
10 U.S.C. § 869 (1964); MCM, 1951, para. 103);
e. The Court of Military Appeals shall review the record in the following
cases:
(1) All cases in which the sentence, as affirmed by a board of review,
affects a general or flag officer or extends to death;
(2) All cases reviewed by a board of review which The Judge Advocate
General orders forwarded to the Court of Military Appeals for review; and
(3) All cases reviewed by a board of review in which, upon petition and
on good cause shown, the Court of Military Appeals has granted a review.
UCMJ, art. 69, 10 U.S.C. § 869 (1964). However, in cases reviewed by a board
of review pursuant to UCMJ art. 69 (see d, above) the accused may not petition
the Court of Military Appeals.
77. MCM, 1951, para. 77a. See also MCM, 1951, para. 48j (1).
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sentence imposed. This form of clemency recommendation is
singularly appropriate in a court-martial case as the court does
not have the power to adjudge a suspended sentence.78 Nothing
contained in a clemency recommendation can operate to impeach
the findings or the sentence of the court.79
The record of trial in a general or special court-martial case
is prepared under the supervision of the trial counsel.80 It is
authenticated by the president and trial counsel, if a special
court-martial,81 or by the president and law officer, if a general
court-martial.8 2 The authenticating officers are responsible for
its accuracy.83 Prior to the record of trial being forwarded to the
convening authority for review and action, it is examined by
the defense counsel. The defense counsel should bring errors or
omissions to the attention of the trial counsel or the officers
required to authenticate the record. 4 If the defense counsel is
not satisfied that an authenticated record of trial is accurately
transcribed, he should first seek to obtain a certificate of cor-
rection.85 Should his attempt to obtain such a certificate fail,
he may make his complaint to the convening authority and high-
er appellate reviewing authority, and may present such evidence
as may be available to sustain his position.
Although the matters to be urged on appellate review are
determined by the accused's appellate defense counsel, if he has
one, the trial defense counsel may in any case prepare and submit
for attachment to the record of trial an appellate brief of such
matters as he feels should be considered in behalf of the accused
78. United States v. Kaylor, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 139, 27 C.M.R. 213 (1959).
79. MCM, 1951, para. 70a. However, a recommendation made by the court
substantially contemporaneously with the pronouncement of the sentence may
operate to render the sentence inconsistent or ambiguous. See United States v.
Kaylor, supra, note 78.
80. MCM, 1951, para. 82a, 83.
81. MCM, 1951, para. 83c.
82. MCM, 1951, para. 82f.
83. MCM, 1951, para. 82a.
84. MCM, 1951, para. 82e.
85. United States v. Walters, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 617, 16 C.M.R. 191 (1954). A
certificate of correction is authenticated in the same manner as the original
record of trial. See MCM, 1951, para. 86c.
86. United States v. Walters, supra, note 85. As indicated in the Walters
case, the Court of Military Appeals will give little or no weight to affidavits
of defense counsel as against a properly authenticated record of trial or certifi-
cate of correction. In fact the court stated that a properly executed certificate
of correction would be regarded as conclusive in the absence of a claim of fraud.
The same should be true where the authenticators refuse to execute a certificate
of correction and stand on the original authentication. However, the court
stated further:
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on review.87 Such a brief would necessarily be considered by the
convening authority and may be of assistance to appellate de-
fense counsel.
An additional post-trial duty of the trial defense counsel is
that of advising the accused concerning his appellate rights.
88
The accused should be advised as to the extent of the automatic
review that his case will receive,8 9 and as to his rights in regard
to appellate representation. 90 The trial defense counsel should
also advise the accused as to the circumstances under which he
may petition the Court of Military Appeals."' It should be em-
phasized that this advice should normally be given, and the
accused's election made, after the review of the staff judge advo-
cate, 92 if any, and the action of the convening authority.
Generally, of course, a party complaining of omissions in a record of trial
should be urged to seek a certificate of correction-and an inability to ob-
tain such a document would bear on the weight to be attached to the com-
plaint. Further, we have no intention of permitting the accused or his coun-
sel to delay indefinitely in presenting a challenge to completeness of the
record [citations omitted]. If such a contention is raised promptly-as will
certainly be required-false allegations can ordinarily be refuted, and true
complaints can usually be verified. It is obvious that, in such instances,
substantial weight must and will be given to determinations by the con-
vening authority and his staff judge advocate concerning the existence or
nonexistence of 'proceedings' unreported in the record of trial.
United States v. Walters, 4 U.S.M.C.A. 617, 16 C.M.R. 191, 200 (1954).
87. MCM, 1951, para. 48j (2).
88. MCM, 1951, para. 48j (3).
89. See note 76 supra.
90. UCMJ, art. 70, 10 U.S.C. § 870 (1964), provides, in pertinent part:
(a) The Judge Advocate General shall appoint in his office one or more
officers as Appellate Government Counsel, and one or more officers as
appellate defense counsel who shall be qualified under the provisions of
article 27(b) (1).
(b) It shall be the duty of appellate Government counsel to represent the
United States before the board of review or the Court of Military Appeals
when directed to do so by The Judge Advocate General.
(c) It shall be the duty of appellate defense counsel to represent the
accused before the board of review or the Court of Military Appeals-
(1) When he is requested to do so by the accused; or
(2) When the United States is represented by counsel; or
(3) When The Judge Advocate General has transmitted a case to the
Court of Military Appeals.
(d) The accused shall have the right to be represented before the Court
of Military Appeals or the board of review by civilian counsel if provided
by him.
91. See note 76 supra.
92. The staff judge advocate of a command is required by law to submit a
written opinion to the convening authority on every record of trial by general
court-martial. UCMJ, art. 61, 10 U.S.C. § 861 (1964). He prepares a similar
opinion in reviewing a record of trial by special court-martial in which a bad
conduct discharge was adjudged and approved. UCMJ, art. 65(b), 10 U.S.C.
§865(b) (1964).
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Clearly, a defense counsel's duty does not end with the
court-martial findings. United States v. Allen, 8 USCMA
504, 25 CMR 8. Here, defense counsel admits he merely
advised the accused "there was little" that an appellate de-
fense counsel could do in his behalf. In that advice, he
misplaced the emphasis. The point is not what the accused
had to lose but what he had to gain by appellate repre-
sentation.
Not only was the emphasis misplaced but the advice was
premature. It was given before the staff judge advocate had
reviewed the case and before the convening authority had
acted upon the findings and sentence.93
Finally, should it be brought to the attention of the defense
counsel that the convening authority in taking action on the
sentence has considered or will consider matters not contained
in the record of trial, the defense counsel should submit such
rebuttal as may be appropriate.
It is a well-settled principle of military law that a con-
vening authority, in approving a court-martial's finding of
guilt, is limited to the evidence adduced in the record of
trial. United States v. Duffy, 3 USCMA 20, 11 CMR 20.
It is equally -well settled that a convening authority is not
limited to the record in acting to disapprove either findings
or sentence or any part thereof. United States v. Massey, 5
USCMA 514, 18 CMR 138.. .. While acting to approve
an appropriate sentence, a convening authority may not con-
sider matters which are derogatory or unfavorable to an
accused derived from sources outside the record without first
affording him an opportunity of rebuttal.94
To insure compliance with the foregoing rule, the defense
counsel of a general court-martial is furnished a copy of the
review of the staff judge advocate on which he states that he has
read the review and does or does not desire to present matters in
rebuttal.
F. Conclusion
Since the enactment of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
and the establishment of the United States Court of Military
93. United States v. Darring, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 651, 26 C.M.R. 431 (1958).
94. United States v. Wilson, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 233, 26 C.M.R. 3, 6 (1958).
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Appeals, military criminal law has developed rapidly into a
highly specialized body of law with many rules of procedure
that are unfamiliar to the civilian practitioner. The military
rules of procedure should be interpreted with the single thought
in mind that "it is apparent that the protections in the Bill of
Rights, except those which are expressly or by necessary impli-
cation inapplicable, are available to members of our armed
forces. 095 The emphasis placed on protecting the rights of the
accused, as manifested by the rules of procedure-pretrial, trial,
and post-trial-make the practice of military criminal law a pro-
fessionally rewarding experience.
95. United States v. Jacoby, 11 I.S.C.MA. 428, 29 C.M.R. 244, 246 (1960).
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